

SECRET

LECTURE ON CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
PRESENTED AT THE AIR WAR COLLEGE
MAXWELL FIELD, ALABAMA
14 NOVEMBER 1947
BY BRIG. GEN. E. K. WRIGHT, DEPUTY DIRECTOR

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IT IS A RARE TREAT TO BE AT THIS
STATION AGAIN AFTER A LONG ABSENCE AND
TO RENEW OLD TIES WHICH WERE MADE DURING
MY SEVERAL YEARS AS AN INSTRUCTOR AT
FORT BENNING.

BUT OF COURSE MY REAL REASON FOR
BEING HERE IS TO DISCUSS CERTAIN ASPECTS
OF INTELLIGENCE AND, PARTICULARLY, THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND ITS
RELATION TO OTHER AGENCIES AND DEPARTMENTS
OF GOVERNMENT.

THERE HAS BEEN ENORMOUS GROWTH, OVER
THE PAST FEW YEARS, IN THE APPRECIATION
OF INTELLIGENCE MATTERS. SOME OF THIS
INCREASED APPRECIATION IS DUE TO A FULL
REALIZATION OF OUR PRE-WAR FAILURES IN
THAT FIELD. SOME OF IT IS DUE TO THE

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REDUCTION IN OUR ARMED FORCES. IT IS AXIOMATIC THAT THE MORE THE ACTUAL COMBAT FORCES ARE REDUCED, THE GREATER IS THE ROLE THAT MUST BE PLAYED BY INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.

HOWEVER, I WANT TO BELIEVE THAT THE FULLER APPRECIATION OF THE VALUE OF AND NEED FOR GOOD INTELLIGENCE IS JUST THAT -- A FULLER APPRECIATION OF THE VALUE AND NEED FOR GOOD INTELLIGENCE!

THIS NATION HAS DEVELOPED REAL COMMANDERS IN ALL GRADES, MOST OF THEM WITH CONSIDERABLE COMBAT EXPERIENCE -- AND ALL WITH A HIGH REGARD FOR OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. FROM THIS KNOWLEDGE OF EXPERIENCE, AN APPRECIATION OF INTELLIGENCE HAS SPREAD THROUGH THE HIGHEST RANKS AND AGENCIES OF OUR GOVERNMENT.

I BELIEVE YOU HAVE HEARD OTHER TALKS ON INTELLIGENCE, FROM THE DEPARTMENTAL VIEWPOINT, AND ARE TO HEAR MORE. THEREFORE, I SHALL ENDEAVOR TO HOLD MY DISCUSSION TO INTELLIGENCE MATTERS ON THE NATIONAL SCALE.

IN DISCUSSING THE SUBJECT OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, I THINK WE MUST BEGIN BY RECALLING TO MIND THE CHAOTIC CONDITION OF OUR INTELLIGENCE PRIOR TO THE WAR.

I THINK IT CAN BE SAID WITHOUT CHALLENGE THAT BEFORE THE WAR OUR INTELLIGENCE SERVICE COULD IN BUT FEW WAYS COMPARE WITH THAT OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, RUSSIA, GERMANY, OR JAPAN. WE HAD A POOR INTELLIGENCE SERVICE BECAUSE THE PEOPLE OF THIS COUNTRY DID NOT BELIEVE IT NECESSARY. IT WAS FELT THAT THERE WAS SOMETHING UN-AMERICAN ABOUT ESPIONAGE AND EVEN ABOUT INTELLIGENCE GENERALLY.

AS THE UNITED STATES FOUND ITSELF SUDDENLY PROJECTED INTO A GLOBAL WAR, IMMENSE GAPS IN OUR KNOWLEDGE BECAME READILY APPARENT. THE WORD "INTELLIGENCE" QUICKLY TOOK ON A FASHIONABLE CONNOTATION. EACH NEW WAR-TIME AGENCY -- AS WELL AS THE OLDER DEPARTMENTS -- SOON BLOSSOMED OUT WITH INTELLIGENCE STAFFS OF THEIR OWN, EACH PRODUCING A MASS OF UNCOORDINATED INFORMATION. THE RESULTANT COMPETITION

FOR FUNDS AND SPECIALIZED PERSONNEL WAS A MONUMENTAL EXAMPLE OF WASTE. THE WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS DEVELOPED FULL POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE STAFFS, AS DID THE RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS DIVISION OF O. S. S. THE BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE AND ITS SUCCESSOR, THE FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION, ALSO DELVED DEEPLY INTO THE FIELDS OF ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE. NOT CONTENT WITH STAFFS IN WASHINGTON, THEY ESTABLISHED SUBSIDIARY STAFFS IN LONDON, AND THEN FOLLOWED THESE UP WITH OTHER UNITS ON THE CONTINENT AND IN THE PACIFIC AREAS.

WHEN, FOR EXAMPLE, OFFICIALS REQUESTED A REPORT ON THE STEEL INDUSTRY OF JAPAN OR THE ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES, THEY HAD TO CHOOSE FROM THE REPORTS OF THE BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE, G-2, ONI, OR THE O. S. S. -- JUST TO NAME A FEW. AND, BECAUSE THESE AGENCIES HAD COMPETED TO SECURE THE BEST PERSONNEL, IT WAS NECESSARY FOR EACH OF THEM TO BACK UP ITS EXPERTS BY ASSERTING THAT ITS REPORTS WERE THE BEST AVAILABLE AND THAT THE OTHERS MIGHT WELL BE DISREGARDED.

DURING THE WAR, THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES -- O. S. S. -- WAS ESTABLISHED FOR THE PURPOSE OF GATHERING TOGETHER MEN OF EXCEPTIONAL BACKGROUND AND ABILITY WHO COULD OPERATE IN THE FIELD OF NATIONAL, RATHER THAN DEPARTMENTAL, INTELLIGENCE. IN WEIGHING THE MERITS OF THE O. S. S., ONE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT IT CAME LATE INTO THE FIELD. IT WAS A STOP-GAP. OVERNIGHT IT WAS GIVEN A FUNCTION TO PERFORM THAT THE BRITISH, FOR EXAMPLE, HAD BEEN DEVELOPING AGGRESSIVELY SINCE THE DAYS OF QUEEN ELIZABETH. WHEN ONE CONSIDERS THESE FACTS, THE WORK OF THE O. S. S. WAS QUITE REMARKABLE AND ITS KNOWN FAILURES MUST BE WEIGHED AGAINST ITS SUCCESSES. MOREOVER, IT MARKED A CRUCIAL TURNING POINT IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM AND WE PROFIT GREATLY BY ITS EXPERIENCES AND MISTAKES.

THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE, WHICH INVESTIGATED THE ATTACK ON HAWAII, REACHED MANY PERTINENT CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE SHORT-COMINGS OF OUR INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM AND MADE SOME VERY SOUND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ITS IMPROVEMENT.

MOST OF THESE HAVE BEEN INCORPORATED INTO OUR PRESENT THINKING.

THE COMMITTEE SHOWED THAT SOME VERY SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION HAD NOT BEEN CORRECTLY EVALUATED. IT FOUND THAT SOME OF THE EVALUATED INFORMATION WAS NOT PASSED ON TO FIELD COMMANDERS. BUT -- OVER AND ABOVE THESE FAILURES WERE OTHERS MORE SERIOUS -- WHICH WENT TO THE VERY FOUNDATION OF OUR INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE. I AM SPEAKING NOW OF THE FAILURE TO EXPLOIT OBVIOUS SOURCES; THE FAILURE TO COORDINATE THE COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE; THE FAILURE TO CENTRALIZE INTELLIGENCE.

THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED THAT INTELLIGENCE WORK HAVE CENTRALIZATION OF AUTHORITY AND CLEAR-CUT ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY. IT FOUND SPECIFIC FAULT WITH THE SYSTEM OF DISSEMINATION -- OR, MORE ACCURATELY, THE LACK OF DISSEMINATION.

IT STATED THAT "THE SECURITY OF THE NATION CAN BE INSURED ONLY THROUGH CONTINUITY OF SERVICE AND CENTRALIZATION OF RESPONSIBILITY IN THOSE CHARGED WITH HANDLING INTELLIGENCE."

IT FOUND THAT THERE IS NO SUBSTITUTE FOR RESOURCEFULNESS ON THE PART OF INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL, AND THAT PART OF THE FAILURE IN THIS RESPECT WAS "FAILURE TO ACCORD TO INTELLIGENCE WORK THE IMPORTANT AND SIGNIFICANT ROLE WHICH IT DESERVES."

THE COMMITTEE DECLARED THAT "EFFICIENT INTELLIGENCE SERVICES ARE JUST AS ESSENTIAL IN TIMES OF PEACE AS IN WAR."

THE END OF THE WAR FOUND THE UNITED STATES IN A POSITION OF INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE AND POWER IN A VERY UNSTABLE WORLD -- AND THAT POSITION MAINTAINS TODAY. WE MUST NEVER AGAIN FIND OURSELVES CONFRONTED WITH THE NECESSITY FOR DEVELOPING PLANS AND POLICIES ON THE BASIS OF INTELLIGENCE COLLECTED, COMPILED, AND INTERPRETED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT. IT IS COMMON KNOWLEDGE THAT WE FOUND OURSELVES IN JUST THAT POSITION, AS REGARDED THE EUROPEAN THEATRE, AT THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR. FOR MONTHS WE HAD TO RELY BLINDLY AND TRUSTINGLY ON THE SUPERIOR INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM OF THE BRITISH. OUR SUCCESSES PROVE THAT THIS TRUST WAS WELL PLACED.

HOWEVER, IN MATTERS SO VITAL TO A NATION HAVING RESPONSIBILITIES OF A WORLD POWER, THE UNITED STATES MUST NEVER AGAIN BE FORCED TO GO, HAT IN HAND, BEGGING A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT FOR THE EYES -- THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE -- WITH WHICH TO SEE.

OUR WAR EXPERIENCE IN THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD, THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE WHICH INVESTIGATED THE HAWAIIAN ATTACK, AND THE STUDIES OF MANY OTHER GROUPS AND COMMITTEES, FOCUSED ATTENTION ON THE NEED FOR A CENTRALIZED INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM.

AS MOST OF YOU KNOW, A NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY WAS ESTABLISHED BY PRESIDENT TRUMAN ON 22 JANUARY 1946, BY EXECUTIVE DIRECTIVE. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP WAS DESIGNATED AS THE OPERATING AGENCY OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY. SINCE THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP HAS NOW BEEN LEGALIZED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947 -- UNDER THE NEW NAME OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY -- I SHALL NOT DISCUSS THE OLD

ORGANIZATION FURTHER -- BUT WILL PROCEED TO THE NEW.

FIRST

~~WITH THIS BACKGROUND,~~ I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS WITH YOU THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947, INsofar AS THEY AFFECT THE INTELLIGENCE PICTURE. THIS ACT ESTABLISHES -- FOR THE FIRST TIME ON A LEGAL BASIS -- A NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, THE FUNCTION OF WHICH IS TO ADVISE THE PRESIDENT ON THE INTEGRATION OF FOREIGN, DOMESTIC AND MILITARY POLICIES RELATING TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY. THE COUNCIL IS TO BE PRESIDED OVER BY THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF, OR BY ANY MEMBER HE MAY DESIGNATE. ITS MEMBERSHIP IS COMPOSED OF THE PRESIDENT, THE SECRETARIES OF STATE, DEFENSE, THE ARMY, THE NAVY, THE AIR FORCE, AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD, TOGETHER WITH CERTAIN OTHERS WHO MAY BE APPOINTED AT THE OPTION OF THE PRESIDENT.

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IS ESTABLISHED UNDER THIS COUNCIL. TO ALL INTENTS AND PURPOSES, THEREFORE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WILL TAKE THE

OLD

PLACE OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY, WHICH IS SPECIFICALLY ABOLISHED BY THE ACT. THE LAW DOES NOT SET FORTH THE POWERS OF THE COUNCIL, AS THEY RELATE TO OUR AGENCY, IN THE MANNER IN WHICH THE PRESIDENT'S ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE ORDER DELINEATED THE POWERS OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY IN RELATION TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP. HOWEVER, THE FACT THAT THE AGENCY IS PLACED UNDER THE COUNCIL WOULD APPEAR TO GIVE THE COUNCIL THE SAME GENERAL AUTHORITIES FOR DIRECTING THE PLANNING, DEVELOPMENT, AND COORDINATION OF ALL FEDERAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES WHICH THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY HAD BEFORE IT.

THE ACT SPECIFICALLY PROVIDES FOR A DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, WHO IS TO BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT, BY AND WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE, FROM EITHER CIVILIAN OR MILITARY LIFE. CERTAIN ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARDS ARE THEN INCLUDED, SO THAT THE DIRECTOR SHALL NOT BE SUBJECT TO THE USUAL SUPERVISION, RESTRICTIONS AND PROHIBITIONS WHICH APPLY

TO MEMBERS OF THE ARMED SERVICES. IT FURTHER STATES THAT HE IS NOT TO POSSESS OR EXERCISE ANY SUPERVISION, CONTROL, POWERS OR FUNCTIONS -- OTHER THAN THOSE HE WOULD EXERCISE AS DIRECTOR -- OVER ANY COMPONENT OF THE ARMED SERVICES. THESE CLAUSES WERE INCLUDED IN ORDER TO ASSURE TO THE SATISFACTION OF THE CONGRESS THAT THE DIRECTOR WOULD BE FREE FROM UNDUE SERVICE POLITICS AND INFLUENCE.

ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT PROVISIONS OF THE ACT VESTS IN THE DIRECTOR THE RIGHT TO TERMINATE THE EMPLOYMENT OF ANY EMPLOYEE OF THE AGENCY, WHENEVER IT APPEARS THAT SUCH TERMINATION IS NECESSARY IN THE INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES. IT CAN BE READILY UNDERSTOOD THAT, IN AN AGENCY SUCH AS OURS, WHERE SECURITY IS PARAMOUNT, THIS RIGHT IS AMONG THE MOST NECESSARY THAT WE COULD HAVE. UNDER NORMAL CIVIL SERVICE PROCEDURES, IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO REMOVE A PERSON FOR INEFFICIENCY, OR FOR THOSE BORDERLINE LOYALTY CASES WHERE THE SENSITIVITY OF AN AGENCY SUCH AS OURS WOULD NORMALLY REQUIRE

TERMINATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, THIS PLACES A VERY HEAVY RESPONSIBILITY ON US, IN REGARD TO CIVIL LIBERTIES, WHICH CANNOT BE LIGHTLY EXERCISED. NONETHELESS, IT IS VITAL TO THE SUCCESSFUL AND SECURE PERFORMANCE OF OUR DUTIES.

THE LAW SPECIFICALLY PROVIDES THAT OUR AGENCY SHALL HAVE NO POLICE, SUBPOENA, LAW ENFORCEMENT POWERS, OR INTERNAL SECURITY FUNCTIONS. THIS PROVISION WAS ALSO IN THE OLD EXECUTIVE ORDER, AND IT IS ONE WHICH WE ARE VERY HAPPY TO HAVE INCLUDED IN THE LAW. WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY URGED THAT CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE HAVE NOTHING WHATSOEVER TO DO WITH POLICE POWERS OR FUNCTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES. THE INTERNAL SECURITY FUNCTIONS ARE PROPERLY A PART OF THE WORK OF THE F. B. I., AND WE HAVE NO DESIRE WHATSOEVER TO INTERFERE WITH THIS. IT IS A BURDEN WHICH WE DO NOT WISH TO ASSUME.

DURING THE CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS WHICH PRECEDED THE PASSAGE OF THIS ACT, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WAS UNDER ATTACK AS A POSSIBLE AND INCIPIENT GESTAPO. WE HELD THAT THIS ARGUMENT HAD NO BASIS, IN FACT, SINCE A GESTAPO CAN ARISE ONLY WHEN POLICE POWERS AND INTELLIGENCE ARE COMBINED IN ONE ORGANIZATION. WE POINTED OUT TIME AND AGAIN THAT OUR INTERESTS ARE SOLELY IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE. THEREFORE, AS I HAVE SAID, WE WELCOME THIS PROVISION IN THE LAW WHICH ELIMINATES ANY POSSIBILITY THAT OUR ORGANIZATION WILL MERGE INTELLIGENCE WITH POLICE POWER, OR ASSUME ANY FUNCTIONS RELATIVE TO THE INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.

AND NOW I WISH TO DISCUSS WITH YOU CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE LAW RELATING TO THE SPECIFIC DUTIES OF THE AGENCY. THESE DUTIES WERE ENACTED "FOR THE PURPOSE OF COORDINATING THE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE SEVERAL GOVERNMENTAL DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES IN THE INTEREST OF NATIONAL SECURITY." IN OTHER WORDS--

BEARING IN MIND THE GREAT POWERS ~~TO~~
~~RECOMMEND THE INTEGRATION OF FOREIGN,~~
~~DOMESTIC AND MILITARY POLICIES OF THIS~~
~~GOVERNMENT~~ WHICH HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO
THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL -- IT
BECOMES APPARENT THAT THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IS TO SERVE AS THE
INTELLIGENCE ADVISOR TO THE COUNCIL ON
ALL MATTERS RESPECTING NATIONAL INTEL-
LIGENCE.

THE NEXT DUTY IMPOSED UPON US BY
THE ACT IS TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO
THE COUNCIL FOR THE COORDINATION OF THE
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERN-
MENT INsofar AS THEY RELATE TO THE
NATIONAL SECURITY. UNDER THE PRESIDENT'S
EXECUTIVE ORDER, THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE WAS ASSISTED BY WHAT WAS
KNOWN AS THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD.
THIS BOARD CONSISTED OF THE SPECIAL
ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR
RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE, THE DIRECTOR
OF INTELLIGENCE OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT
GENERAL STAFF, THE CHIEF OF NAVAL INTEL-
LIGENCE, AND THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF AIR
STAFF - 2. WHILE THERE IS NO SPECIFIC

STATUTORY PROVISION FOR THE CONTINUANCE OF THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD, THE LAW PERMITS THE APPOINTMENT OF NECESSARY ADVISORY COMMITTEES, AND WE WILL MAINTAIN THIS BOARD AND CONTINUE TO LEAN ON IT FOR ADVICE IN ALL PHASES OF OUR ACTIVITIES. IT ENABLES US TO KEEP IN CLOSE AND INTIMATE CONTACT WITH THE DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT. IN ADDITION, PROVISION IS MADE TO INVITE THE HEADS OF ~~OTHER~~ INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT, *OTHER* THAN THOSE MENTIONED BEFORE, TO SIT AS MEMBERS OF THE ADVISORY BOARD ON ALL MATTERS WHICH WOULD AFFECT THEIR AGENCIES. IN THIS MANNER, THE BOARD SERVES TO FURNISH THE DIRECTOR WITH ~~THE BENEFITS OF~~ THE KNOWLEDGE, ADVICE, EXPERIENCE, VIEWPOINTS, AND OVER-ALL REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEPARTMENTS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE. THESE RECOMMENDATIONS, WHEN ADOPTED, CAN SERVE AS THE BASIS OF MANY OF THE DIRECTOR'S RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE COUNCIL FOR THE COORDINATION OF OUR GOVERNMENT'S INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES.

THIS PLANNED COORDINATION IS OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE IN DETERMINING PRIMARY FIELDS OF INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES. WE ARE -- IN THE FIELDS OF COLLECTION, PRODUCTION, AND DISSEMINATION -- WORKING TO PREVENT OVERLAPPING FUNCTIONS; THAT IS, TO ELIMINATE DUPLICATE ROLES AND MISSIONS, AND TO ELIMINATE DUPLICATE SERVICES IN CARRYING OUT THESE FUNCTIONS.

To Go on with the Law --

THE NEXT PARAGRAPH OF THE LAW PROVIDES FOR THE CORRELATION AND EVALUATION WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT OF INTELLIGENCE RELATING TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY. THIS IS A MAJOR COMPONENT OF A SUCCESSFUL CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, COMING UNDER THE BROAD GENERAL HEADING OF PRODUCTION, AND INCLUDING THE EVALUATION, CORRELATION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION GATHERED FOR THE PRODUCTION OF INTELLIGENCE. IT INVOLVES THE PROCESS OF SYSTEMATIC AND CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING ITS USEFULNESS, CREDIBILITY AND

ACCURACY. IT INVOLVES THE SYNTHESIS OF THE PARTICULAR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WITH ALL AVAILABLE RELATED MATERIAL. IT INVOLVES THE PROCESS OF DETERMINING THE PROBABLE SIGNIFICANCE OF EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

INFORMATION GATHERED IN THE FIELD IS SENT TO THE DEPARTMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR ITS COLLECTION. THIS MATERIAL IS NECESSARY TO THAT DEPARTMENT, IN THE COURSE OF ITS DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS. EACH DEPARTMENT MUST HAVE PERSONNEL AVAILABLE TO DIGEST THIS INFORMATION AND PUT IT TO SUCH USE AS IS NECESSARY WITHIN THAT DEPARTMENT. THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES MUST BE CONSTANTLY INFORMED OF THE SITUATION WITHIN THEIR OWN FIELDS TO DISCHARGE THEIR OBLIGATIONS TO THIS COUNTRY. WITH THIS DEPARTMENTAL NECESSITY, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE WILL NOT INTERFERE. EACH DEPARTMENT MUST

EVALUATE AND CORRELATE AND INTERPRET
THAT INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION WHICH
IS WITHIN ITS OWN EXCLUSIVE COM-
PETENCE AND WHICH IS NEEDED FOR ITS
OWN DEPARTMENTAL USE.

THE IMPORTANCE OF RESEARCH TO
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
BECOMES EVIDENT WHEN WE START TO
DEAL WITH INTELLIGENCE ON A NATIONAL
AS DISTINGUISHED FROM A DEPARTMENTAL
LEVEL. THE RESEARCH PROVIDED BY THE
CENTRAL AGENCY MUST BE TURNED TO THE
PRODUCTION OF ESTIMATES IN THE FIELD
OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE

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IS THAT COMPOSITE INTELLIGENCE, INTER-DEPARTMENTAL IN CHARACTER, WHICH IS REQUIRED BY THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER HIGH OFFICIALS AND STAFFS TO ASSIST THEM IN DETERMINING POLICIES WITH RESPECT TO NATIONAL PLANNING AND SECURITY IN PEACE AND IN WAR, AND FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF BROAD NATIONAL POLICY. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE IS IN THAT BROAD POLITICAL - ECONOMIC - MILITARY AREA, OF CONCERN TO MORE THAN ONE AGENCY. IT MUST BE OBJECTIVE, AND IT MUST TRANSCEND THE EXCLUSIVE COMPETENCE OF ANY ONE DEPARTMENT. SUCH AN ESTIMATE AS I HAVE JUST DESCRIBED WAS PREPARED BY US ON THE SITUATION IN TURKEY AT THE TIME WHEN THE PRESIDENT EXPOUNDED THE DOCTRINE OF AID TO TURKEY. [THIS PARTICULAR STUDY NOW SERVES AS THE BASIC HANDBOOK FOR OUR MISSION IN TURKEY.] 1,3ay

ONE OF THE GREATEST CONTRIBUTIONS WHICH A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY MAKES IS THE PREPARATION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES. PREVIOUSLY, IF THE PRESIDENT DESIRED AN OVER-ALL ESTIMATE

OF A GIVEN SITUATION, HE HAD TO CALL, FOR EXAMPLE, UPON THE WAR DEPARTMENT, WHICH WOULD FURNISH HIM WITH THE MILITARY AND AIR PICTURE; THE NAVY DEPARTMENT, WHICH WOULD PRESENT AN ESTIMATE OF THE NAVAL POTENTIALITIES AND CAPABILITIES; AND ON THE STATE DEPARTMENT, WHICH WOULD COVER THE POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL PICTURE. BUT NOWHERE WOULD THERE BE AN OVER-ALL ESTIMATE. EACH DEPARTMENT WOULD, OF NECESSITY, PRESENT AN ESTIMATE SLANTED TO ITS OWN PARTICULAR FIELD. NOW IT FALLS TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TO PRESENT THIS OVER-ALL PICTURE IN A BALANCED, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE, INCLUDING ALL PERTINENT DATA. FROM THIS THE PRESIDENT AND APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS CAN DRAW A WELL-ROUNDED PICTURE ON WHICH TO BASE THEIR POLICIES. AND IT SHOULD BE CLEARLY BORNE IN MIND THAT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DOES NOT MAKE POLICY.

THE ESTIMATES FURNISHED IN THE FORM OF STRATEGIC AND NATIONAL POLICY INTELLIGENCE BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FILL A MOST SERIOUS GAP IN OUR

PRESENT INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURE. THESE ESTIMATES SHOULD REPRESENT THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE, COMPLETE AND PRECISE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE TO THE GOVERNMENT. WITHOUT A CENTRAL RESEARCH STAFF PRODUCING THIS MATERIAL, AN INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM WOULD MERELY RESEMBLE A COSTLY GROUP OF FACTORIES, EACH MANUFACTURING COMPONENT PARTS, WITHOUT A CENTRAL ASSEMBLY LINE FOR THE FINISHED PRODUCT.

THE ACT ALSO CHARGES US WITH THE APPROPRIATE DISSEMINATION OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT. INDEED, DISSEMINATION IS ALWAYS A MAJOR COMPONENT OF A SUCCESSFUL INTELLIGENCE OPERATION. YOU WILL RECALL THAT ONE OF THE GREAT FAULTS FOUND BY THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE WAS THE FAILURE OF APPROPRIATE DISSEMINATION OF SOME OF THE WONDERFUL INTELLIGENCE WE HAD AVAILABLE TO US. JUST AS THERE IS NO PURPOSE IN COLLECTING INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION UNLESS IT IS SUBSEQUENTLY ANALYZED AND WORKED INTO A FINAL PRODUCT, SO THERE IS

NO SENSE IN DEVELOPING A FINAL PRODUCT IF IT IS NOT DISSEMINATED TO THOSE WHO HAVE NEED OF IT. THE DISSEMINATION OF INTELLIGENCE IS MANDATORY TO THOSE OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT WHO NEED IT TO MAKE THEIR DECISIONS.

A CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, PROPERLY COGNIZANT OF THE INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS OF THE VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES, IS BEST EQUIPPED TO HANDLE THE DISSEMINATION TO ALL DEPARTMENTS OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL TO MEET THESE REQUIREMENTS. THE COMPLEXITIES OF INTELLIGENCE, THE IMMENSITIES OF INFORMATION AVAILABLE VIRTUALLY FOR THE ASKING, ARE SO GREAT THAT THIS INFORMATION MUST REACH A CENTRAL SPOT FOR ORDERLY AND EFFICIENT DISSEMINATION TO ALL POSSIBLE USERS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT.

SPECIAL MENTION IS MADE IN THE UNIFICATION ACT OF THE FACT THAT THE DEPARTMENTS AND OTHER AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT SHALL CONTINUE TO COLLECT,

EVALUATE, CORRELATE AND DISSEMINATE DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE. A LITTLE EARLIER I MENTIONED TO YOU THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN DEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE ONE HAND AND NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE OTHER. WE HAVE SEEN, AS I HAVE PREVIOUSLY STATED, HOW TWO OF THE MAJOR COMPONENTS OF INTELLIGENCE -- NAMELY, PRODUCTION AND DISSEMINATION -- ARE HANDLED IN CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. I NOW WISH TO TURN FOR A FEW MINUTES TO THE THIRD MAJOR COMPONENT -- COLLECTION.

THE ROLE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IS TO COORDINATE ~~THE~~ COLLECTION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND TO AVOID WASTEFUL DUPLICATION. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SHOULD COLLECT POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE IN ITS BASIC FIELD. THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY SHOULD DEVOTE ITS EFFORTS PRIMARILY TO THE COLLECTION OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE. THERE SHOULD BE NO REASON, FOR EXAMPLE, FOR THE MILITARY ^{OR AIR} ATTACHE TO FURNISH THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY ^{OR AIR} WITH DETAILED POLITICAL AND POLITICO - ECONOMIC ANALYSES. THIS MATERIAL SHOULD

BE COLLECTED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT. IF A MILITARY ATTACHE SHOULD RECEIVE POLITICAL INFORMATION, HE SHOULD HAND IT RIGHT ACROSS THE DESK IN THE EMBASSY TO THE APPROPRIATE MEMBER OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE, AND VICE VERSA.

WE ARE ENGAGED IN MAKING CONTINUAL SURVEYS OF ALL GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES TO ASCERTAIN THEIR REQUIREMENTS IN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE. WHEN TWO OR MORE AGENCIES HAVE SIMILAR OR IDENTICAL REQUIREMENTS, THE COLLECTION EFFORT FOR ONE CAN BE MADE TO SATISFY ALL OTHERS. THE ONLY ADDITIONAL ACTION NECESSARY IS THE ADDITIONAL DISSEMINATION.

IN DETERMINING, APPORTIONING, AND ALLOCATING THE PRIMARY FIELD OF RESPONSIBILITY AMONG THE VARIOUS AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT, IT IS USEFUL TO NOTE ONE ADDITIONAL FACTOR. AFTER THIS MASS OF MATERIAL HAS BEEN STUDIED AND EVALUATED, CERTAIN GAPS IN THE OVER-ALL PICTURE WILL BE READILY APPARENT. A CENTRALIZED INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, INTENT ON COMPLETING THE

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE PICTURE, MUST HAVE THE POWER TO SEND OUT COLLECTION DIRECTIVES AND REQUEST FURTHER MATERIAL TO FILL THESE GAPS. ONCE THE INITIAL FIELD OF COLLECTION IS DELINEATED, THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SECURING THE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CAN BE PROPERLY CHanneLED AND APPORTIONED. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, HOWEVER, NEEDS THE AUTHORITY GRANTED ORIGINALLY BY THE PRESIDENT'S DIRECTIVE, AND NOW BY LEGISLATION, TO COORDINATE ALL THIS FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION.

I FEEL IT IS SAFE TO SAY THAT IN PEACE TIME APPROXIMATELY 75 PER CENT OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION NECESSARY TO SUCCESSFUL OPERATION CAN AND SHOULD BE COLLECTED BY OVERT MEANS. BY OVERT MEANS, I MEAN THOSE OBVIOUS, OPEN METHODS WHICH REQUIRE, BASICALLY, A THOROUGH SIFTING AND ANALYSIS OF THE MASSES OF READILY AVAILABLE MATERIAL OF ALL TYPES AND DESCRIPTIONS. INTO THE UNITED STATES THERE IS FUNNELLED SO VAST AN AMOUNT OF INFORMATION FROM SO MANY VARIED SOURCES THAT IT IS VIRTUALLY

STAGGERING. IT ENCOMPASSES EVERY FIELD OF ENDEAVOR -- MILITARY, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, AGRICULTURAL, MINERAL, LABOR, SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL, AMONG OTHERS -- AN ENDLESS AND INEXHAUSTIBLE SUPPLY.

IF WE FAIL TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THESE VAST MASSES OF MATERIAL, WE ARE DELIBERATELY EXPOSING THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF A POLICY DICTATED BY A LACK OF INFORMATION. WE MUST REALIZE ALSO THAT WE ARE COMPETING WITH OTHER NATIONS WHO HAVE BEEN BUILDING UP THEIR INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS FOR CENTURIES TO KEEP THEIR LEADERS INFORMED OF INTERNATIONAL INTENTIONS -- TO INFORM THEM LONG BEFORE INTENTIONS HAVE MATERIALIZED INTO ACTION.

AMONG THE PRIMARY COLLECTING AGENCIES IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ARE THE MILITARY, AIR AND NAVAL ATTACHES OF THE DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT, AND THE FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

AGENCY CAN NOT AND WILL NOT SUPPLANT THESE PEOPLE. THEY DO MOST VALUABLE WORK IN THE FIELD OF COLLECTION. AS NATIONAL AIMS AND NEEDS IN THIS FIELD ARE ESTABLISHED, THEIR VALUE WILL BE INCREASINGLY APPARENT. THIS WILL BE PARTICULARLY TRUE AS THE BOUNDARIES OF DEPARTMENTAL COLLECTION BECOME FIRMLY DEFINED, AND WASTEFUL DUPLICATION AND OVERLAP ARE ELIMINATED OR REDUCED.

AS I STATED, IT IS NOT THE PROVINCE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TO TAKE OVER DEPARTMENTAL COLLECTION ACTIVITIES. THIS IS THE TYPE OF COLLECTION WHICH CAN BEST BE DONE BY THE EXPERTS OF THE DEPARTMENTS IN THEIR VARIOUS FIELDS.

THE LAW PROVIDES ONE SECTION WHICH ESTABLISHES THE RIGHT OF THE AGENCY TO COLLECT CERTAIN INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL, AND I SHALL QUOTE THIS SECTION VERBATIM:
"TO PERFORM, FOR THE BENEFIT OF EXISTING INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, SUCH ADDITIONAL

SERVICES OF COMMON CONCERN AS THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DETERMINES CAN BE MORE EFFICIENTLY ACCOMPLISHED CENTRALLY.ⁿ THIS SECTION IS WRITTEN PRIMARILY TO ALLOW THE AGENCY TO ENGAGE IN FOREIGN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS -- TO GIVE TO THE UNITED STATES, FOR THE FIRST TIME, THE ESPIONAGE SYSTEM WHICH IS, UNFORTUNATELY, MADE NECESSARY BY CONDITIONS IN THE WORLD TODAY. IN ADDITION, IT ALLOWS US TO PERFORM CERTAIN COLLECTION AND OTHER FUNCTIONS WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE TO BE DONE INDIVIDUALLY BY EACH OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT -- STATE, ARMY, AIR, NAVY, AND THE REST. HOWEVER, WHEN THESE FUNCTIONS ARE PERFORMED CENTRALLY, THE SAVINGS AND SERVICES DERIVED ARE CONSIDERABLE. AS A RESULT, THE VARIOUS AGENCIES WELCOME THE BENEFITS GAINED FROM SUCH CENTRALIZATION AND NO LONGER WISH TO PERFORM THESE FUNCTIONS THEMSELVES. I WILL CITE YOU TWO EXAMPLES.

WE HAVE TAKEN OVER THE EXPLOITATION OF ~~CAPTURED~~ FOREIGN DOCUMENTS. THESE FUNCTIONS WERE FORMERLY PERFORMED, IN CONNECTION WITH JAPANESE DOCUMENTS, BY THE WASHINGTON DOCUMENT CENTER, A JOINT SERVICE VENTURE. SIMILARLY, WE HAVE TAKEN OVER THE GERMAN DOCUMENT CENTER, FORMERLY OPERATED BY THE WAR DEPARTMENT. IT HAS BEEN FELT THAT THIS TYPE OF FUNCTION CAN BE MOST ECONOMICALLY AND EFFICIENTLY PERFORMED BY A CENTRAL AGENCY SUCH AS OURS, FOR IT POOLS THE SKILLED LINGUISTIC PERSONNEL AND THE DISSEMINATION FUNCTIONS.

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STATINTL
SECONDLY, WE HAVE ASSUMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE OPERATION OF THE [REDACTED] [REDACTED] WHICH MONITORS APPROXIMATELY TWO MILLION WORDS OF FOREIGN BROADCASTS A DAY. THIS SERVICE RESTED WITH ^{THE} FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION DURING THE WAR, AND WAS SUBSEQUENTLY TRANSFERRED TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT. THE ARMY AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS ARE BOTH BIG USERS OF THIS MATERIAL, BUT THE STATE DEPARTMENT IS PERHAPS THE BIGGEST USER OF THE THREE.

THEREFORE, THIS FUNCTION WAS AN UNWARRANTED BURDEN ON ANY ONE DEPARTMENTAL BUDGET. IT WAS FINALLY DETERMINED TO CENTRALIZE THE OPERATION IN THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP AS ONE WHICH COULD BEST BE PERFORMED CENTRALLY. THUS MANY AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT RECEIVE THIS SERVICE. I HASTEN TO ADD THAT THE MONITORING OF FOREIGN BROADCASTS IS BECOMING AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT SOURCE OF INFORMATION. IT IS ABLE TO BRING IN VALUABLE INFORMATION A GREAT DEAL FASTER THAN NORMAL ATTACHE CHANNELS. MOREOVER, A CONTINUAL STUDY OF A COUNTRY'S BROADCASTS OVER A PROTRACTED PERIOD OF TIME BRINGS FURTHER INTELLIGENCE WHICH CAN BE SECURED BY NO OTHER MEANS.

TO GIVE AN EXAMPLE OF THE WORTH OF THIS MONITORING, I CAN CITE THE FACT THAT WHEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE, GENERAL MARSHALL, WENT TO MOSCOW LAST MARCH, HE REQUESTED AND WE FURNISHED HIM WITH A DAILY ROUNDUP OF 500 WORDS ON SOVIET BROADCASTS REGARDING THE GERMAN AND AUSTRIAN TREATIES. WHEN THE PRESIDENT,

SHORTLY AFTER GENERAL MARSHALL'S DEPARTURE, ENUNCIATED THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE, WE ADDED MONITORING REPORTS OF FOREIGN REACTION TO THE DOCTRINE TO OUR DAILY ROUNDUP FOR THE SECRETARY IN MOSCOW.

WHEN THE SECRETARY RETURNED HOME, AMBASSADOR SMITH -- WHO HAD FOUND THESE SUMMARIES MOST HELPFUL -- REQUESTED THAT WE CONTINUE THEM, AND WE CURRENTLY FURNISH HIM 1500 TO 2000 WORDS A DAY.

FINALLY, ~~I HAVE STATED THAT THIS~~ SECTION OF THE LAW, WHICH INSTRUCTS US TO PERFORM CERTAIN FUNCTIONS CENTRALLY, IS USED AS THE ^{Authority} ~~CLOAK TO HIDE THE RIGHT~~ TO OPERATE THE CLANDESTINE SERVICES OF THE UNITED STATES WHICH HAVE BEEN ASSIGNED TO US BY THE PASSAGE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947.

THE COLLECTION OF INFORMATION BY THIS MEANS HAS BEEN OVER-DRAMATIZED, AND UNFORTUNATELY, OVER-PUBLICIZED. HOWEVER, I BELIEVE WE SHOULD FRANKLY ACKNOWLEDGE THE NEED FOR AND PROVIDE THE MEANS OF COLLECTING THAT INTELLI-

GENCE WHICH CAN BE OBTAINED ONLY BY CLANDESTINE METHODS. IN THIS WE ONLY FOLLOW, LATE BY MANY YEARS, THE POLICY AND EXAMPLE OF EVERY MAJOR FOREIGN POWER. WHEN PROPERLY PROVIDED FOR AND ESTABLISHED, THESE OPERATIONS MUST BE CENTRALIZED IN ONE ORGANIZATION. THE EXPERIENCE OF THE BRITISH SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OVER HUNDREDS OF YEARS PROVES THIS. THE GERMANS VIOLATED THIS PRINCIPLE -- AS DID THE ITALIANS AND THE JAPANESE -- WITH DISASTROUS RESULTS FOR THEMSELVES.

FAILURE ALWAYS MARKS A MULTIPLICITY OF SECRET INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS. STUDY OF MANY INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, TALKS WITH THOSE WHO HAVE OPERATED IN THE FIELD OF SECRET INTELLIGENCE FOR LONG PERIODS OF TIME, AND POST-WAR INTERROGATIONS OF HIGH INTELLIGENCE OFFICIALS IN THE AXIS COUNTRIES, HAVE SHOWN CONCLUSIVELY THAT WHEN THERE ARE SEPARATE SERVICES, THE RESULT IS CHAOS, SO FAR AS PRODUCTION OF INFORMATION IS CONCERNED. INTERNAL BICKERING, WITH

CONTINUAL SNIPING, DEVELOPS BETWEEN THE VARIOUS SERVICES. THERE WERE TOO MANY GERMAN SPY ORGANIZATIONS, EACH OF THEM JEALOUS OF THE OTHER. THEY ALL DEVELOPED A POLICY OF SECRECY, SO THAT EACH MIGHT BE THE ONE TO PRESENT SOME JUICY TIDBIT OF INFORMATION TO THE LEADERS. COORDINATION WENT OUT THE WINDOW.

IF THE UNITED STATES IS TO ENTER CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS IN ANY AREA ABROAD, THEN SUCH OPERATIONS SHOULD BE CENTRALIZED IN ONE AGENCY TO AVOID THE MISTAKES INDICATED, AND WE SHOULD FOLLOW THE EXPERIENCE OF THE INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS OF OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE PROVEN SUCCESSFUL IN THIS FIELD.

WE HAVE BEEN USING BIG WORDS AND HIGH-SOUNDING PHRASES. SUPPOSE, IN CLOSING, WE LOOK AT INTELLIGENCE FROM A BASIC ANGLE: --

ALL INTELLIGENCE IS NOT SINISTER,
~~NOW~~ ^{NOR} IS IT AN INVIDIOUS TYPE OF WORK.
THERE ARE MANY WAYS OF ILLUSTRATING JUST

WHAT INTELLIGENCE IS -- BEYOND THE COLD DEFINITION OF THE WORD. ONE WAY IS TO CONSIDER THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE OF A NATION AS A KIND OF SUPER JIG-SAW PUZZLE. WHEN FIRST SEEN, THE PIECES OF THE PICTURE ARE ALL CONFUSED. THEN THE ANALYST STARTS WORKING AND SOON THERE EMERGES A PARTIAL SOLUTION -- ABOUT 75 PER CENT OF THE PUZZLE. THIS PART IS MADE UP OF THE PIECES THAT ARE AVAILABLE FROM OVERT SOURCES -- BOOKS, CHARTS, PERIODICALS, RADIO BROADCASTS, TECHNICAL SURVEYS, PHOTOGRAPHS, COMMERCIAL SURVEYS, GENERAL INFORMATION, ETC.

NOW WE HAVE 75 PER CENT OF THE PICTURE AND ARE BEGINNING TO SEE THE CAPABILITIES AND POTENTIALS OF OUR TARGET COUNTRY. THERE ARE STILL GAPS AND TO FILL THESE GAPS WE MUST RESORT TO CLANDESTINE AND COVERT METHODS. THAT WILL PROBABLY GIVE US 15 PER CENT MORE OF THE PICTURE. AT THIS POINT -- BY DEDUCTION -- WE CAN PROBABLY GET 5 PER CENT MORE. THE FINAL 5 PER CENT IS

PROBABLY UNOBTAINABLE AS IT CONSISTS OF IDEAS AND POLICIES NOT EVEN FORMULATED, EXISTING ONLY IN THE MINDS OF THE LEADERS OF OUR TARGET COUNTRY. BUT THE 95 PER CENT WE DO HAVE SHOULD GIVE, WITHIN VERY NARROW LIMITS, THE POTENTIAL, THE CAPABILITIES, AND THE PROBABLE AND POSSIBLE INTENTIONS OF OUR TARGET.

IN CONCLUSION, I WOULD POINT OUT THAT WHAT WE HAVE DONE SINCE JANUARY 1946 IS AN ATTEMPT TO BRING ORDER OUT OF CHAOTIC CONDITIONS IN WHICH INTELLIGENCE FOUND ITSELF BEFORE AND DURING THE WAR. IN MY OPINION, THE FIELD OF INTELLIGENCE HAS AT LAST REACHED THE STAGE WHERE IT OFFERS TO THE GRADUATES OF THIS COLLEGE AND TO MEMBERS OF ANY OF THE ARMED FORCES A SERVICE CAREER SECOND TO NONE IN IMPORTANCE. IF MY REMARKS TODAY HAVE HELPED IN ANY WAY TO FOCUS YOUR ATTENTION UPON THAT FACT I WILL HAVE ACCOMPLISHED MY PURPOSE.

TO THOSE OFFICERS OF THE ARMED

SERVICES WHO TURN THEIR THOUGHTS TO
INTELLIGENCE AS A CAREER, I CAN ONLY
SAY THAT THEIR DECISION WILL BE OF
MAXIMUM SERVICE TO THIS COUNTRY. WE
OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ARE LOOKING
FORWARD NOT ONLY TO CONTINUING OUR
WORK, BUT TO DEVELOPING AND IMPROVING
IT, NOW THAT WE HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED
BY CONGRESS AS A PERMANENT AGENCY.

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